The Indus River originates in the Tibetan plateau, making its 3,200km journey southwards along the entire length of Pakistan, before emptying into the Arabian Sea. The river basin is divided between Pakistan, which has about 60 per cent of the catchment area, India with about 20 per cent, Afghanistan with 5 per cent and around 15 per cent in Tibet. The two major riparian’s, Pakistan and India have extensively dammed the Indus River to provide for irrigation and hydroelectricity
The Indus has five main tributaries. The Jhelum, the largest of these, originates in the Valley of Kashmir. The Chenab, a second tributary, flows through the Jammu region of the state of Jammu and Kashmir before entering the Indian state of Punjab. The remaining three tributaries (Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) either originate or flow through India’s state of Himachal before entering Indian Punjab.
As a result, if the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, were to move from being a Defacto to a recognized international border, India would permanently become the upper riparian and Pakistan the lower riparian of the Indus River and all of its tributaries.
The Indus is a river system that sustains communities in both India and Pakistan. In Pakistan, it is the only river system supporting the country, where more than 92 per cent of the land is arid or semi-arid. In India, it is one of two main river systems supporting the country’s northwest: Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan (generally considered to be water deficient areas).
Given that over half of Pakistan’s population is employed in the agricultural sector and that Punjab produces more than 20 per cent of India’s wheat and is known as the “breadbasket” of the Republic of India, the importance of the Indus River to the well-being and economy of both countries cannot be overemphasized.
THE POLITICAL HISTORY
In arbitrating the border between India and Pakistan in 1947, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the chairman of the bodies set up to demarcate the borders, was unable to decide what to do with the Indus River system, given that it was likely to be vital to both states.
The biggest problem, of course, lay with the partitioning of the state of Punjab, as it contained a complex irrigation system built by the British to be run under a single administration. The task was eventually delegated to the Chief Engineers of East Punjab (India) and West Punjab (Pakistan) who agreed to allow the existing water sharing systems to continue until the following year. This Standstill Agreement between India and Pakistan expired on March 31, 1948. On the following day Indian Punjab cut off water flow to Pakistan.
The conflict in Kashmir overlapped with the water disputes, and by January 1948 India had taken the Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). On April 21, 1948, a resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal of all troops was passed.
The Kashmir dispute and disputes over the sharing of water resources are intertwined. From independence to the present day, they remain the two biggest challenges when it comes to normalizing relations between the states of India and Pakistan.
Later in 1948, Eugene Black, then president of the World Bank, offered the services of his organization to help negotiate a solution to the water-sharing dispute between the two countries. Although India was not eager to allow third-party involvement, both countries eventually agreed to this proposal.
Evidence and records from the time suggest that in 1948, when the Kashmir issue was taken to the UNSC and the canal dispute between East and West Punjab first
In the early days of independence, the fact that India was able to shut off the Central Bari Doab Canals at the time of the sowing season, causing significant damage to Pakistan’s crops, exposed a central weakness and vulnerability in the newly created state that was desperately trying to establish its independence. As noted by one British general on a visit to the area in 1948, the dispute centers around the “water insecurity” of Pakistan, as all of its rivers either originate in or pass through India.
Indian ministers at the time were also issuing statements, saying that controlling the entire flow of the Indus River would be impossible, “even if India controlled Kashmir”. It would appear that somewhere along the ideological path, as negotiations on water were being held, politicians worked out that a resolution to the water dispute may well directly influence the Kashmir problem.
Indeed, some experts have suggested that Pakistan thought that it could solve the Kashmir dispute through solving canal-related issues, but India completely denied this route of resolution. Consequently, the Indus Water Treaty was signed by both countries in September 1960, giving exclusive rights over the three western rivers of the Indus River system (Jhelum, Chenab and Indus) to Pakistan, and over the three eastern rivers (Sutlej, Ravi and Beas) to India.
The signing of the treaty and the financing of various water storage projects to benefit Pakistan and India meant that tensions were minimal and to a great degree much of Kashmir’s water importance was forgotten for the next couple of decades
As the populations of both countries increased exponentially, however, water resources came under increasing stress. With India preparing ambitious irrigation project plans, it was possible to see how, by the 1990s, Kashmir’s hydrological importance had once again become a serious issue. The fact that, unlike India, all of Pakistan is wholly dependent upon the Indus River system is a geographical reality. John Briscoe, a subcontinental water expert, former World Bank senior water expert and currently a professor at Harvard University, recognized Pakistan’s unhappy position in the following words: “This is a very uneven playing field. The regional hegemon is the upper riparian and has all the cards in its hands.”
Pakistan is all too aware of its vulnerable position vis-a-vis water and the fact that more than half of independent Pakistan’s time has been spent under military rule has not helped to de-escalate or ‘de-securities’ the water discourse in the country. Over the years, water has been raised as an issue directly linked to Kashmir. Pakistan’s political leaders and military elites have emphasized that if they are forced to let go of their claim to Kashmir, that will mean letting go of the source of Jhelum and Chenab as well and being at the mercy of India for water.
Though it is unrealistic to assume that India could readily and easily violate the terms of the Indus Water Treaty, Briscoe emphasizes that Pakistan and India do not have “normal, trustful relations”. The trust deficit along with the fact that India once blocked water flows to Pakistan has the military establishment convinced that they must hold on to their claim to Kashmir in an effort to maintain the country’s water security.
Throughout the history of the dispute, India has rarely, if ever, acknowledged that it has tampered with the supply of water flowing into Pakistan. Since there is also a large amount of secrecy that surrounds the governance of the Indus waters and data is not readily shared, there is no definitive way to prove whether India has just got caught up in Pakistani sensationalism or whether the seeds of resentment and securitization of water were sowed and are being maintained by the Indian side. In negotiations and meetings with Pakistani counterparts on the wider Indo-Pak relationship, India does not deal with water and Kashmir as the same issue. In fact, it has often been suggested by analysts that a more consolidated agreement on water might perhaps be a more readily achievable goal in India-Pakistan composite dialogue as compared to Kashmir. Briscoe finds that the Indian press seems to have a uniform view on water issues, in relation to Pakistan. He says that it was explained to him as follows: “When it comes to Kashmir – and the Indus Treaty is considered an integral part of Kashmir” – the ministry of external affairs (India’s foreign ministry) instructs the media about what they are allowed to say. In certain cases, India is happy to conflate the Kashmir and water issues, whereas in negotiations with Pakistan it would like to deal with them as distinct and separate.
Currently, India is in the process of building a number of dams on the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers (both of which originate in Kashmir), such as the Kishanganga, Dal Huste, Sawalkot etc. The Indus Water Treaty allows India to harness the hydropower potential of the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers, as long as it does not reduce or delay the supply to Pakistan. India therefore maintains that its projects are in compliance with the treaty and sees no conflict with Pakistan on these issues. The region of Kashmir sees itself losing considerably from the Indus Water Treaty because it is not allowed to fully exploit the hydropower potential of its own rivers. Given that both Pakistan and India are dangerously energy and water starved and nowhere close to an agreement on Kashmir, teamed with the impact of climate change and population pressures, the prognosis on the Indo-Pak water problem involving Kashmir is anything but positive. The unilateral breaking of the Indus River water treaty by India against Pakistan, is an unprovoked escalation. Indian is tempestuous and childish. The only reason why we pay any attention to India is because of their most unwelcomed export; The Indian people.
Now they are threatening to create a humanitarian disaster in Pakistan by diverting upstream water away from Pakistan, they have already done so against Bangladesh.
This and the fact that India is siding with the US against the world in the trade war, should be abundantly clear to everyone, that India is a feebleminded nation who are obsequious to the strong.
The only way to deal with this type of bully is to stand firm and be ready to use violence. On that part, China and the rest of the nations of South Asia stands with Pakistan.
Pakistan army chief Asim Munir’s pet six canal projects had led to a bitter dispute between Pakistan’s Punjab & Sindh provinces & had threatened the survival army-backed Sharif govt. Modi, by suspending the Indus Water Treaty, helped Munir to easily wiggle out of that crisis.